From the middle of the 19 th century until the mid-20th century, Britain played a significant role in determining the development of political institutions and practices of citizenship in the Middle East that was to leave a substantial legacy. Articulated in different ways according to the particular needs of the situation, the British imperial project engaged with local regimes and traditions, the requirements of the contemporary international context, and where necessary popular demands, to lay a foundation of public culture and practice based on conceptions of nationality and citizenship and democratic institutions as the basis of a body politic, even as it qualified the scope and authority of such institutions. In so doing it sought to establish its own priority of establishing stable states sympathetic to its imperial interests. The result was a mixed legacy that provided a legal framework of citizenship and constitutional rule but qualified rights and a tradition of authoritarian rule with which to curb opposition that would readily taken up by local elites. In exploring the evolution of these conceptions and practices of citizenship during this period, this chapter will focus on the cases of Egypt, the mandates of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and the Gulf states of Kuwait and Bahrain.
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CHAPTER 4
The British Legacy in the Middle East Anthony Gorman From the middle of the 19 th century until the mid-20th century, Britain played a significant role in determining the development of political institutions and practices of citizenship in the Middle East that was to leave a substantial legacy. Articulated in different ways according to the particular needs of the situation, the British imperial project engaged with local regimes and traditions, the requirements of the contemporary international context, and where necessary popular demands, to lay a foundation of public culture and practice based on conceptions of nationality and citizenship and democratic institutions as the basis of a body politic, even as it qualified the scope and authority of such institutions. In so doing it sought to establish its own priority of establishing stable states sympathetic to its imperial interests. The result was a mixed legacy that provided a legal framework of citizenship and constitutional rule but qualified rights and a tradition of authoritarian rule with which to curb opposition that would readily taken up by local elites. In exploring the evolution of these conceptions and practices of citizenship during this period, this chapter will focus on the cases of Egypt, the mandates of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and the Gulf states of Kuwait and Bahrain.
Background
From the beginning of the nineteenth century Britain came to exercise an increasingly significant and at times dominant role in Middle Eastern political affairs.
While its role in the defeat of the French in Egypt in 1801 announced its presence in the region it did not take up a more specific authority until the second half of the century. With the occupation of Egypt in 1882 which continued in various guises, from the initial so-called veiled protectorate to the formal protectorate of [1914] [1915] [1916] [1917] [1918] [1919] [1920] [1921] [1922] , and on until its withdrawal in 1956, Britain embarked on the first major example of a number of imperial commitments. In the mandatory administrations of 3 Throughout this period the British government presided over a process of constitutional change in which governing institutions were defined, terms of nationality formulated, and the rights of citizens, whether explicitly or implicitly, delineated. In promoting this course the British authorities invoked the virtues of democracy, constitutional government and an active citizenry. This was the case, particularly in the mandatory administrations where Britain was entrusted with the role by the League of Nations of laying the basis of representative institutions, legal and social rights and the protection of minorities.
Despite these claims and commitments, in shaping institutions of governance and a culture of citizenship British policy was not driven primarily by such ideals but was characterised by a pragmatic and flexible approach, largely qualified by British concerns about political stability and calculations made to maintain a continuing British presence and its future influence. This was also moderated through competing demands of the local population that involved negotiation with the local elites and an engagement, whether accommodation or resistance, with popular calls for the recognition of particular political, economic, social and cultural rights. The results of this political project and the dynamics of the relationship that it established would play a significant part in determining the trajectory of citizenship as a practice in the post-colonial period.
Constitutional Rules
Constitutional reform was a central pillar of British rule in both Egypt and the mandates. In 1883 soon after the occupation of Egypt, a new constitution (organic law) was promulgated that laid the basis for government and administration for the 
The National Citizenry
Integral to the process of setting up the constitutional basis for these states was a legal definition of nationality and citizen rights. In the case of Egypt this seemed less urgent. Although the 1923 constitution contained a section On the Rights and Duties of Egyptians stating important principles, until the passing of a new nationality law in 1928 Egyptian nationality still relied on nineteenth-century Ottoman legislation.
In the mandates, the general principle applied with the nationality laws was that former Ottoman subjects would by definition automatically acquire the nationality of the state in which they were now resident. 11 This was most clearly the case in the Iraqi Nationality Law of 1924 and a similar provision was applied in Transjordan. In Palestine, where the terms of the mandate had specifically required the establishment of a citizenship law, the Palestinian Citizenship Order of 1925 included the same provision and thus immediately accorded citizenship to the majority Arab population in Palestine. 12 However, more particular were the conditions for the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship: the applicant had to have been resident for a certain period of residence, demonstrate a good character and possess an "adequate knowledge" of English, Arabic or Hebrew. The last clearly referenced the promise of the British government to support Palestine as a Jewish national homeland (which had been formally incorporated into the terms of the mandate), and provided a legal support for Jewish immigration and settlement.
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Definitions of nationality were much more exclusive in the Gulf States. Kuwaiti nationality was only defined in law in 1948 and was restricted to a narrowly defined group made up of members of the ruling family, those who had been permanently resident in Kuwait since 1899 (a date which referenced the agreement between Britain and Mubarak the Great), and children of Kuwaiti fathers or of Arab or Muslim men born in Kuwait after that time. Naturalisation was allowed after 10 years' residence but was also conditional on Arabic proficiency. 13 A decade later in 1959 the law was amended with 1920 (the year of the war between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) now set as the date by which permanent residence was established while the requirements for naturalisation became more restricted. 14 
Minority Rights
The Ottoman Empire had been governed by a Muslim political elite which accommodated different religious communities through the millet system that delegated authority to the community on matters of property and personal status. In its dealing with the issue of minority representation, British policy never institutionalised sectarian identity to the extent that the French administration did in Lebanon. However, the formal recognition of ethnic identity, ostensibly contrived to be inclusive could also serve as an effective divide-and-rule strategy that arguably undermined the concept of a single national citizenry. In Egypt, a country which had The subsequent discussion and rejection by the Egyptian constitutional committee of a provision for separate parliamentary representation for Copts was significantly preoccupied with how the British government might exploit this issue. 25 While the majority decision to reject such a provision was later styled as a statement of the integrity of the national citizen body the ongoing issue of Coptic representation in parliament demonstrates its continuing political sensitivity and the religious dimension that has been applied to Egyptian citizenship.
The Citizen and Political Rights
In presiding over a process of codification of nationality laws and constitutions, and the recognition of various minority rights, the British sought to lay the foundation of and win support for its programme of state-building. Nationality laws served to define citizen status but specific rights were often undefined or circumscribed by law and, in any case, conceived from the top down. The restrictive nature of these legal formulations and the constraints of local practices severely inhibited the growth of an active and genuine citizenship. marked the beginning of a period of more formal party organisations but those that followed again served more as vehicles for the traditional elites and their followers 27 Khadduri, Independent Iraq, [29] [30] 34 Crystal, Oil and Politics, 46-47. 35 Crystal, Oil and Politics, 48-51. 37 Ismael, Communist Party of Iraq, 23-24. 38 Gorman, "Containing Political Dissent," 161.
Yet, while the virtues of a free and open press were regularly intoned, and indeed, often endorsed by constitutions, the banning of newspapers and other publications that were (usually) deemed to have exceeded appropriate criticism of government policy or figures was common. The Ottoman press laws were carried over in large part into the interwar period but mandatory administrations and their successors readily added to this regulatory and increasingly punitive regime. 39 Press freedom may have been guaranteed explicitly in the constitution but it was also limited by expressed concerns about safeguarding the 'public order'. 40 During the interwar period in Egypt the changing press law regime required greater financial guarantees for newspaper ownership and afforded less press freedom under an increasingly repressive penal code. The practice of suspending or banning newspapers became a regular practice during the 1920s and 1930s, that included not only oppositional party newspapers deemed to be a danger to the fundamental safety of the state but journalists were imprisoned for criticising in print the government or king. 41 In late Ottoman era Iraq and Palestine, a press had also begun to forge a tradition of public comment and discourse of rights. 42 65-66, 92-93. 40 See, for example, the Egyptian constitution of 1922, art.14 ("Freedom of opinion shall be ensured".) and art.15 ("The press shall be free within the limits of the law. Censorship of newspapers shall be prohibited….") http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/1923_-_egyptian_constitution_english_1.pdf (last accessed 30 August 2015) 41 Gorman, "Containing Political Dissent," 165. 42 Longrigg, Iraq, [44] [45] For details, see Longrigg, Iraq, 110. editorial hostile to King Faisal, al-Djila was banned. 44 The practice of state regulation of the press was maintained thereafter and indeed codified in the Iraqi constitution of 1930. 45 Commission recommended a further extension in the powers of the press laws, a strategy that assisted in suppressing the Arab Revolt and was facilitated by the introduction of the Emergency Regulations. 50 The press played a similar role of representing the voice for an increasingly articulate citizenry in the Gulf. In Bahrain from at least the 1940s, it served as an important forum for the discussion of democratic values, the rights of the individual and in the 1950s pro-Arab nationalist ideas, despite the attempts of the British Agency to curb criticism and maintain the political status quo were able to be disseminated. 51 44 Bashkin, Other Iraq, [21] [22] [23] . 45 Ayalon, Press in the Arab Middle East, 260 n. 25. This was also true of the constitutions of Lebanon (1926) and Syria (1930) , and the Organic Law of Jordan (1928) . 46 Bashkin, Other Iraq, 107. 47 Peel Commission, 83, 190. 48 Peel Commission, 193 
The Citizen as Worker
If party political rights remained limited and the right to freedom of expression was often curbed, the demand for social and economic rights could come from other quarters. The labour movement provided one important locus for this struggle where (usually) male workers used the threat or actual withdrawal of their labour to secure an improvement----in their working conditions, particularly regarding pay, hours of work and safety conditions----from employers and legal recognition from state authorities within a broader framework of workers' economic rights. 1914 -1932 : Archive Editions, 1992, 245. 58 Iraq Administration Reports, 1920-31, vol. 10, 243, and Ismael, Communist Party of Iraq, 312, give slightly differing accounts of these events.
was suppressed for the next decade even if labour disruptions would continue. 59 This series of strikes had it made clear to some Iraqi politicians that there needed to be some recognition of the rights of workers. In December 1931, a proposal was put before the Chamber of Deputies calling for the limitation of working hours, provision of holiday pay and preference for local over foreign labour in foreign companies.
After considerable debate, the proposal was passed and forwarded to the government for consideration. 60 
British Legacies
British power in the Middle East oversaw a process governed by the interplay between its imperial policies, calculated compromises between British authorities and local elites, and a range of responses to popular action determined the forum for the contestation of citizen rights. The constitutions laid down in Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, employed the language of nationality, of representative institutions, of the rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech raised the expectations for an active citizenship. However, the exercise of political rights 70 Fuccaro, Histories of City and State, [176] [177] [178] [179] [180] [181] [182] [183] [184] [185] [186] [187] [188] [189] [190] . 71 Crystal, Oil and Politics, [79] [80] through the ballot box, of freedom of speech through publication and legal recourse, were marginalised and neutralised, often by the very legal system itself. The constriction of party political life, the use of imprisonment to curb opposition voices, and the censorship of the press had become a feature of Egyptian political life even before the First World War and would be taken up elsewhere.
In Iraq, the British vision to create a new state and citizenry rested on the legal foundation of a constitution, nationality law and recognition of minority rights. Yet, the effectiveness of these legal instruments was encumbered by British imperial purpose and its compromise with local elites. Political, social and economic rights often remained abstract without a sufficient local engagement or support for them to be sustained and developed. As Khadduri noted, "The form of the Iraq Government was determined [… ] under the impact of Western ideals; the forces which affected its working were to be found in existing local conditions." 72 State institutions were unable to support the emergence of a participatory citizenship resulting in a general failure in nurturing a genuine civic spirit and 72 Khadduri, Government of Iraq, 22. 73 'The mandate had left Iraq with a democratic form of government on paper, but without the institutions to implement it in practice.', Stefanie K. Wichhart, "During the Second British Occupation of Iraq, 1941 -5," Journal of Contemporary History 48, no. 3 (2013 The legal protections and the constitutional guarantees notwithstanding, the range of strategies employed by the British government, often with willing local elites, to undermine the citizen rights were embraced by their local successor governments to even greater significant effect after the departure of the British. Martial law was 75 Ireland, Iraq, In 1936 only about 57 percent of all Jewish residents entitled to Palestinian citizenship had claimed it, Peel Commission, 332. 77 Peel Commission, 371. 1935, again in 1948, 1952 and 1956. 80 With the constraints on the practice of citizenship rights, progressive social forces sought by various means to articulate, demonstrate and remonstrate their claims for rights. In this political organisations (if not formally recognised parties), the press and social movements such as the labour movement played an important part in seeking to counter an increasingly authoritarian state in liberal dress. The record of the freedom of the press and labour activism across these states shows that these avenues of expression and spaces for an engaged citizenship while active were seriously impeded by political, social and economic obstacles and the claims for rights were often compromised, ignored, manipulated or modified. The press as an oppositional voice was often strangled and social actors such as the labour democratic country governed by its citizens was far from being the case. In due course this pattern of privileging political stability and defending its hold on power practiced by the British authorities was embraced and extended by local elites.
Conclusion
In negotiating its imperial interests, international obligations and engagement with local elites, the British government oversaw the emergence of a model of citizenship in the Middle East that was both limited and qualified. While in principle based on a model of some form of participatory democracy, British policymakers favoured government controlled by a strong executive head, most often a monarch, in which appointed officials and indirect representation through a secondary voting system muffled the potential impact of the popular electorate. Political parties, where permitted, often reflected the interests of traditional elites and rarely represented a broader public interest. In nurturing this type of political system and citizenry, Britain was more easily able to maintain its control, at least in the short term. Where new organisations or groups sought to challenge the status quo, as did the communist movement, liberal intellectuals and the labour movement, they were marginalised, repressed or coopted by the regime. In this environment the recognition of formal rights or favourable policies to minority communities risked the emergence of a unified citizen body and provided political opportunities that were both exploited by the British themselves and had the potential to be employed by elements among the indigenous elites to scapegoat or favour particular groups.
Whether formally bound by the obligations of the mandate as in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, or elsewhere where they were less accountable to the international community, British policies nurtured a calculated compromise between the promotion of a flawed constitutional democracy and its own imperial purpose. In 
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exercise of political rights and freedom of speech was circumscribed. These different arrangements and the strategies adopted to counter challenges to them had a clear impact on the development of the body politic and the political culture that would inform the subsequent development of citizenship in the post-colonial age.
Ultimately, the British legacy was of illiberal democracy where limited citizen rights appeared more rhetorical than real and the institutions set up to service them were not properly rooted in local society but compromised by imperial design and local elite interest. The traditional political classes themselves were willing to effectively constrain any sense of active dynamic citizenship, often using the authority of the law to contain opposition, curb criticism and limit activism. In the post-colonial period, the weakness of these liberal institutions and their failure to implant a genuine sense of citizenship and empowerment among the population continued to undermine the state as a genuine vehicle for the expression of the popular will. The 
